This Question was asked already in the days of the Geonim, as brought in the Rosh (Baba Metzia chapter 6 Siman 6) in the name of Rav Sa’adia Gaon, that it is forbidden to give a GOI money and tell him to buy a product for me on Shabbat.

This psak was then quoted in many Rishonim. Rabeinu Yerucham distinguished between telling the GOI to buy a product for me to tell him to buy it for himself knowing that I might buy it from him after SHABBAT.

Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim, Siman 307 Seif 2) paskined all the above. Even though some Achronim are a bit more lenient about what is allowed to be said to the Goi, most Poskim stick to Maran’s Psak.

In light of this, the only option is to ask the GOI to buy the tickets for himself and inform him there is a chance you will buy the tickets from him after Shabbat.

In Siman 4 (Orach Chaim) Shulchan Aruch states different times one must wash their hands with a natla.
In Seif 19 He quotes the Gemara (Pesachim 112a) that he who shaves his hair must wash his hands, so it is MAMASH the din to wash netilas Yadayim after having a haircut.

Rav Itzchak Yosef wrote in the name of his father (Yalkut Yosef Siman 4 page 406) that both the one cutting the hair and the one having their hair cut need to wash.

How many times to wash?

This is a debate between the Achronim.
The Chida (Machzik Beracha Siman 4 SK 6) paskines that once is enough, and it doesn’t even need to be with a NATLA.
On the other hand, the SHLA is quoted by many Poskim as demanding washing the hands 3 times, and some Poskim wrote many compliments to those who are careful with these details.

A special halacha is mentioned in the Talmud Yerushalmi (tractate Yoma, Chapter 8, Halacha 1) that there is a difference between the prohibition of washing(rechitza) on Yom Kippur and the prohibition of oiling(sicha). The Torah forbade washing on Yom Kippur because there is pleasure in it. Hence, an ablution that does not involve pleasure is permitted. Therefore, it is permissible to clean the hands from dirt or a baby’s faeces.

But, oiling the body is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, and therefore, the Gemara states that one must never oil the body on Yom Kippur, no matter what the purpose. Only when there is no dimension of pleasure in the oiling, such as oiling done for a purely medical purpose, then it is permissible to oil on Yom Kippur.
This halacha was brought by the Shulchan Aruch (Siman 614 halacha 1) and the Mishna Berura (ibid.).

Many Poskim referred to the use of a deodorant on Yom Kippur. Among them, some do not allow the use of perfume and deodorant because of lubrication, for example, Piskei Teshuvot (Siman 614 letter A).
On the other hand, most of the recent Poskim referred to the use of perfume and deodorant as washing, and in that case, if the use of deodorant is done for pleasure then it would be prohibited, but if the purpose of using it is to prevent unpleasant odours then it would be permitted. This is what Rav Ovadia specifically wrote (Chazon Ovadia, Ta’aniyot, page 295), Rav Neventzel (Yerushalim Be’Moadeha, p. 274), and this is what they say in the name of the Grashaz.

Indeed, most of the rabbis of our time in Eretz Yisrael ruled like this- Rav Dov Lior, Rav Ya’acob Ariel, Rav Eliezer Melamed and many others.

I would add a significate point. There is a big difference between Israel and England in terms of the weather at this time of the year. Every person should be concerned about whether he needs to use deodorant. If he knows that even in cool weather like in England (and maybe even really cold) he ends up sweating in a way which spreads unpleasant odours to those around him- surely he should put on deodorant. If this is not the case, it is correct not to use deodorant at all on Yom Kippur.
Of course, deodorant can be put on right before the beginning of the fast.

An important point to mention – there is no use of stick deodorant on Yom Kippur but only a spray, just like on Shabbat. Using a stick deodorant is a prohibition of “spreading” (memare’ach).

In the holy language of the Torah, Yom Kippur is called “Sabbathon” (שבתון) and therefore its laws are exactly the same as the Sabbath, with the exception of the five prohibitions. On Shabbat we say “Shabbat LaHashem” (and there is a very good newsletter in that name, too), meaning that the whole day is dedicated to the worship of Hashem, so there is no place for matters of secular nature on this holy day.

Since Yom Kippur is like Shabbat, it is inappropriate and perhaps even forbidden to engage in secular matters on Yom Kippur.
It is told the Kotzker Rav said that he does not feel that he never fasts. His talmidim asked him – what do that mean? We can see you fasting ?!?
He said to them – Of cours I don’t eat or dring, but it never feels as if I’m fasting. Because of my health, I only fast Tisha B’av and Yom Kippur.
On Tisha B’Av, out of sadness, who can even eat?
On Yom Kippur, because of its holiness and us being like angles, who even thinks of eating?
Halevai we would take a little of this attitude towards the holy day, on which all our sins are atoned for, and we would really make sure that we single out the few free hours we have for learning Torah.

enough with what is forbidden.
What is allowed to study?
Everything.
Of course, there is a special virtue in studying matters related to Teshuva and avodat hamidot, and there are many books from which you can learn –
Jonah book. (all, not long)
Hilchot Deot by Rambam
Hilchot teshuva by Rambam
Sharei Teshuva (if it were possible – the whole book)
Chovat Ha’Talmidim (especially the chapters that teach one to take responsibility for himself)
Mesillat Yesharim (if you can learn the introduction well on Yom Kippur – wonderful!)
Rabbi Zadok HaCohen’s Tzidkat Ha’Tzadik (mainly the first part)
Orot Teshuva by Rabbi Kook (the first 3 chapters are easier to understand)

Those who want to learn other things – this is certainly welcome and desirable. Every Torah study on this day is important.

An important note – Torah study is good at any time except during tefila. Even those who do not feel any connection to the reciting of the long piyuts, it is appropriate for them to stand in silence with the public and reflect on thier actions than to learn Torah, because then he “withdraws from the public”, and on the day when we connect together with all people of Israel and “pray even with the criminals” it is not appropriate to withdraw from the public.

This is a Question on which a 50-page article could be written, so I will really try to give a little sense of the guidelines of the Sugya.
Maybe we should organize a set of shiurim on the subject in a certain framework.

So.

The commandment “You shall not insult the deaf or place a stumbling block before the blind” is one of the prohibitions commanded by the Torah (Vikrah chapter 19 Pasuk 10). It is known as “Lifnei Iver”. In addition to being a prohibition and a Halachah Mi’Daoriyata, the Torah added a curse on the blind deceiver (Devarim, chapter 27, Pasuk 18). The prohibition is one of the moral standards “bein adam lachavero”, and therefore it is found as a law in many countries in the world, including Israel.
The simple understanding of the Pasuk is not to cause the blind to fail on the way, but Chazal extended the prohibition to giving any misleading advice to a person or causing another person to commit a sin.

The main example given by Chazal of giving advice against Halacha is the offering of a glass of wine to a Nazir (monk), who is forbidden to drink wine. In the same Gemara (Avoda Zerah, page 6b), Chazal state that the prohibition “Lifnei Iver” exists only when the one doing the offence cannot sustain it by himself, and only through my assistance is he able to perform it. But, if the person can commit the offence by himself and I only help him , I do not violate the prohibition “Lifnei Iver” but another prohibition called “helping the hand of offenders” (AKA “Mesayea”).

In light of this principle, the Rama wrote (Orach Haim Siman 163) that it is forbidden to offer bread to someone who has not washed his hands or to someone who does not make a Bracha, because by doing so we violate the prohibition “Lifnei Iver”.

The Grashaz Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo Siman 141 seif 35) laid down an important principle that is the basis of the discussion nowadays-
If by refraining from helping a friend you will make him hate religion and Judaism, then you must help him, because making him hate religion is a more serious offence and sin, and precisely by this I violate “Lifnei Iver”.
An example – according to the Rama, I am not allowed to serve a glass of water to a person who does not bless before drinking. Indeed, if by me not doing so that person will be terribly offended and will hate the religious in his heart and will despise the Torah and its laws, I have to give him a glass of water even though he won’t bless, thus saving him from a severe prohibition of hating the Torah.

Many big rabbis agreed with this important principle, including Igrot Moshe (Orach Haim, Part 5, Mark 13), Rabbi Wazner (Shevat HaLevi, Part 4, Mark 17), Rav Sternbuch (Teshuvot Ve’hanhagot, Part 1, Mark 17), Rabbi Asher Weiss (Minach Asher, Vayikra, Siman 6, letter 6) and many more.

Some caveats should be noted in connection with this principle. In the name of the Chazon Ish (Halakhot of shvi’it, Siman 12, mark 9) it is said that he will agree with this principle only if there is doubt whether or not the other person will say a Bracha, but if we are confident that he will not, then we should not allow handing him the drink.

It should also be noted that Grashaz himself wrote that the permit is only for one-on-one meetings, but certainly, one should not make public or organize a public event in this way.

In any case, according to all of the above, there is no prohibition of “Lifnei Iver” when inviting a person who may hate the religion if we refrain from inviting him.

Rav Asher Weiss added another point –
The condition that must be met to violate “Lifnei Iver” is that the person would not have been able to sin without my help. The example in the Gemara (Avoda Zara above) is of a nazir who is on one side of a river, and on the other side of the river, there is a bottle of wine, which the nazir cannot reach. If I throw the bottle of wine to the nazir I will be violating the prohibition of “Lifnei Iver”, because without me he would not have been able to commit the crime. In contrast, if the bottle was placed next to him and I just handed it to him, in such a case I did not violate “Lifnei Iver”.

According to this principle, Rav Asher Weiss has a chidush- the person we want to invite on Shabbat, in any case, will drive on Shabbat, if not to me then somewhere else. His drive in the car was not caused by me, and even without me the sin would still have been made, so there is no “Lifnei Iver” prohibition here.

But things get a little complicated.

Although we have now learned that if the bottle of wine and the nazir are on the same side of the river, then when I give him the bottle I do not violate “Lifnei Iver”, but Tosafot write (Shabbat 3a, baba) that in this case, there is a prohibition MiDerabanan of “helping the hand of transgressors”, and it will be forbidden to hand the bottle to the monk even on one side of the river.
In a different place, the Tosafot wrote (Chagiga, page 13a, Ein) that the prohibition of “helping in the hands of those who commit a crime” also applies only when it comes to two different crossings of the river, i.e., in that without my help the person would not have been able to commit the crime.

How can we explain the contradiction in the words of Tosafot?

The Shach (Yoreh Dea Siman 151 seif-Katan 6) explained that for a Jew who observes Torah and mitzvot we should prevent him from committing averot, therefore whether in the case everything is on one side of the river or in the case of two sides of the river, there is a prohibition to help him commit a sin. On the other hand, A Jew who is defined as “Israel mumar” (converted Israel), we have no obligation to prevent him from committing sins, and therefore, if he can commit the crime without my help, the problem of “Lifnei Iver” doesn’t exist. Rabbi Asher Weiss also agrees with the ruling of the Shach, as do many others.

So, now we have to ask – the Jew we want to invite for a Shabbat meal, is he the first type of Jew the Shach talked about or the second type?

The answer is- that that is a complicated Question.

On the one hand, if he is willing to drive to us on Shabbat, it means that he has no problem with violating Shabbat in the public space, and according to Halacha, we rule that anyone who contravenes Shabbat in parrhesia is considered a converted Jew. If so, I have no obligation to prevent this Jew from committing offences, and by combining the principle of the Grashaz with the explanation of the Shach, we can invite him to the Shabbat meal.
On the other hand, many Poskim today refer to secular Jews as “tinok shenishba” (Rambam Mamrim chapter 3), and if so, surely, we must prevent them from committing transgressions. If so, even the Jew who is willing to violate Shabbat in Parrhesia must not be invited to the Shabbat meal.

So, the answer will very much depend on how we define our relatives.

After all the above, which is only a very small portion of this massive Sugia, these are the instructions, and they are based on Rabbi Yaakov Ariel’s Psak (Be’ohala shel Torah, part 5, Siman 22)-
1. It is of great interest to maintain a warm and loving relationship with all relatives. With those who do not observe Torah and mitzvot, there is an even greater need to maintain contact, so that we can also bring them closer to our way of life.

2. The first rule – guests are always invited for the entire Shabbat. They are offered to sleep over, and we arrange accommodation for them, all that needs to be done so that as far as we are concerned, we have made all the arrangements so that they do not have to violate Shabbat by driving home.

3. When it is clear to us beyond any doubt that they will not stay but return to their homes by car, many Poskim say they should not be invited at all.

Rav Yaakov Ariel wrote that this is indeed true for the day meal, but for the night meal, there is an option to invite provided that we organize accommodation arrangements and honestly offer the option of staying for the entire Shabbat.

In such a case, the drive to us is done before Shabbat, while the drive home is done against my will as the host, so it certainly does not violate “Lifnei Iver”.

4. Many rulings were written, including by Rav Ya’akov Ariel, that it is permissible to invite to the Shabbat night meal only when there is no other possibility to create closeness and connection with the relatives. If there is a possibility to meet on weekdays or in any other setting, certainly we should not build contact with these people on the base of chilul Shabbat.

In two places in Shas we find the need to wash our hands in the morning.

The first is in Masechet Berachot (60b), where as part of listing the Brachot one should say in the morning, we are told that when washing our hands we must bench “Al Netilat Yadaim”.

The second place is in Masechet Shabbat (108b-109a), where Chazal describe bad outcomes that will occur to anyone who touches holes/openings of the body before washing their hands three. according to this, we wash our hands in the morning because of the danger.

at first glance, we might think that we can link the two sources. but Aruch Hashulchan (Orach Chaim, Siman 4 paragraph 4) explains that it isn’t halachicly appropriate to establish a Bracha on an act we do that isn’t a mitzvah-
If washing our hands is just protection, then there is no reason to bench before it.

according to him, this is why the Rishonim gave different reasons why we wash our hands in the morning. we have found two main reasons that the Rishonim give-
The Rosh (masechet Berachot, )- while asleep our hands move around, and obviously they touch our intimate parts. so, when we wake up and want to get going with our daily routine of tefila and learning Torah, we need to wash our hands first. according to this, washing our hands is an introduction to tefila.
The Rashba (responsa, vol 1, Siman 191)- when waking up in the morning we are like a new creation as if we were just born. In light of that, we should start our “new life” with kedusha, just like the Cohen starts his work in the Mikdash by washing his hands.

I might add, there might be some evidence in Chazal for Rashba’s explanation. In the Zohar (part 1, page 184b), Rashbi teaches us that at night, while we are sleeping, the Neshama leaves the body and returns to Hashem until the morning. at that time when our Neshama has gone, a “ruach tumah” settles in our bodies until the Neshama returns in the morning.
The first thing that comes to mind when hearing that the Neshama leaves the body is- death. according to that, when she returns in the morning it is some kind of birth.
Anyway, halachicly, the Mishna Berura (Siman 4, Seif Katan 1) quotes both Rishonim and paskins that we obey both explanations.

Therefore, we should wash our hands twice every morning- once immediately when waking up, and the second time before Shacharit.
The Mishna Berura quotes the Chyei Adam and the Gra, who both agree that the main reason we wash our hands is an introduction to tefila, so we must say the Bracha adjacent to the second netila.
And that is exactly what I do every day-
I get out of bed and immediately do netila the first time, without a Bracha.
after I get dressed and leave for shul I do netila a second time as I start Birchot Hashachar, this time benching too.

Hi,
You are asking about the version that we find in our siddur of the 13 principles of faith.
This is important to know, that the Rambam didn’t write that!
The Rambam wrote his principles of faith in his perush on the Mishna, in the introduction to Perek Chelek.
In his writing, he proves each principle, quotes psukim for some, and explains each one. This is a very very important peace to read, so I am sending it here as a PDF.

What we have in our siddur is a short summary of Rambam’s writing. There are different assumptions about who wrote it, but it isn’t that significate. BTW, if you look in a sefardi siddur you will find that no psukim are brought for any of the principles (and other changes too).
Enjoy reading the special words of the Rambam.

this is a great Question with an even greater one hiding between the lines, so to answer I want to explain a bit about the meaning of Tefila.

There is a special Halachac that when we daven to Hashem we must know who we are standing upon when davening. “דע לפני מי אתה עומד”. The reason for this halacha is simple- one must be sure that he is praying to Hashem and not to some idol.
We must ask ourselves- how can we know that we are actually standing in front of Hashem? do you know him? can we know him? After all, Hashem is Infinite, he has no body nor the image of a body and is not attainable from our point of view. so, how can we be confident that we are praying to the right persona?

Let’s say that I have the same problem with emails- there is someone that I want to reach via email, but I don’t have the address, how can I get in touch?
well, the best way is if that person sends me an email, and then I can respond.

The same with Hashem!

As human beings, he is out of our reach. But, If he reaches out to us we can respond.
This means, that if Hashem doesn’t address me first I can’t address him back.

So, the only ones that can daven are those that Hashem spoke to, AKA Nvi’im, prophets. once Hashem speaks to them, they can answer back.

This also answers a serious Question- how do we dare to tell Hashem how to rule the world? where do we get the chutzpa to think we know better than him what to do, and give him our advice?
The Nevi’im do!
They know how Hashem wants to rule the world because they talk to him, they hear directly from him what he wants and how, so they know to daven.

If we search through the Tanach for the people that daven to Hashem, they always are Nevi’im. distinctly, we can find this principle with Avimelach seeking healing, and Hashem told him that Avraham will prey on him because Avraham is a prophet.

So, back to Moshe-
according to all the above, we must say that Moshe Rabeinu knew that Hashem wants him to save Am Yisrael by his davening.
Chazal even see this within Hashem’s words-
“הרף ממני ואשמידם”.
“Now, let Me be”
Chazal understand this as a hint to Moshe- let me go so that I can destroy them, meaning that if Moshe doesn’t let go (as if he is holding on to Hashem) Hashem won’t hurt Am Yisrael.

So, Hashem’s intention was that Moshe would daven and save Am Yisrael. Moshe knew that because he is a prophet who knows Hashem’s desires. Hashem never changed his mind.

In the Mishna (Mikvaot chapter 4 Mishna 1) we found a discussion between the Tanaim on a case where a person placed utensils under the pipe and they filled with rainwater, is the water kosher for a mikvah. And these are the opinions:
Beit Shammai – the water is invalid, whether he put the dishes there or he forgot them dishes there.
Beit Hillel – Only if he put the dishes there on purpose the water is invalid, but if he forgot the dishes there, and they were filled with water without his knowledge, the water is kosher for a mikvah.
Then, other Tanaim argue if this disputation was settled ot not:
R. Meir – We rule like beit shamai that if he placed dishes under the pipe, the water is invalid in any case. Although in the case that he forgot the dishes in the middle of the yard and not under the pipe, everyone agrees that the water is kosher.
R. Yossi – the dispute still goes on, so we rule as Beit Hillel, like elsewhere.

Regarding the person who places the dishes in the middle of the yard and not under the pipe, it is said in the Gemara (Shabbat 16b) that if he placed the dishes at a time when it was likely to rain (such as when there are many clouds in the sky), then the water is invalid, and if he placed the dishes at a time when the sky was clear of clouds, the water is kosher for a mikvah .

The Rishonim differed both on the interpretation of the Mishnah and the interpretation of the Gemara, but for our purpose we only need the principle that emerges from the sugia- a utensile that was placed on purpose to receive rainwater, the water that is stored in it is invalid for the mikvah because it is considered pumped water, and this is how it was ruled in the Shalan Aruch (Yorah Dea Siman ra Section D and Section M).

In the question, the bucket was places under the leaking water with the intention of the water dripping into the bucket, so the water is invalid for Mikvah.

“Pumped water” has the following laws:
invalid to dup in.
If they join a water reservoir that does not yet have 40 sea, they do not join to complete the mikvah for 40 sea.
It is permissible to pour the pumped water into a mikva that already has 40 sea in it with the desire to fill it more, since a mikva that has 40 sea of kosher water in it is not disqualified from pumped water.

The custom of saying “Ma Tovo” is first mentioned among the Rןshonim, and probably has its origin already among the Geonim.

As a result, there is no halachic obligation to say them even when davening in a synagogue, but this is how it is accepted in all communities.

Therefore, one should not change from the custom of Clal Am Yisrael, and since the order of reciting these verses is part of the preparation for Tefila, they should be said even when not praying in the synagogue.

In general, one should make great efforts to daven in shul even when not praying in a minyan, because the shul is a place where Kedusha is always fixed and it is special for Tefila (Shulchan Aruch Orach Haim, Siman 90, seif 9).

As there any many different issues to get into, and that would make this to long for a whatsapp answer, I will just write the guidelines for davening in a car or other form of transportation::
It is always better to daven in shul.
A driver is not allowed to daven- either he can’t concentrate or he is danger (and endangering others). The only solution is to stop the car and daven.
If stopping on the side of the road- don’t get out of the car, rather daven inside it.
If you arn’t the driver and taking a stop for Tefila isn’t possible (even timewise), then you can Daven sitting.
When davening sitting, one should still put his legs together (Mishna Berura, Siman 95/2).
An effort should be made to face Jerusalem (Mishna Berura, Siman 94/15).
At the places in Tefila we bow, you should bow as much as you can (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim Siman 94 Seif 5).
If there is room to stand (on bus, train, boat or plane), then saying Tefila standing up is better, given that you can still concentrate enough. If that isn’t possible, act like in a car.
According to many Poskin, davening alone (not as part of a minyan) and in a car isn’t allowed as part of a daily routine, but only as a one off.

This is one of those Halachot that sometimes is a bit tricky to explain, but I’ll do my best.

The mishna (Beitza 36b) states that is it forbidden to dance on Shabbat. the Gemara explained that Chazal feared that while dancing one might fix a musical instrument, which is not allowed on Shababt. So, this is a Gzeira of Chazal, which means dancing on Shabbat is a prohibition miderabanan. This din is brought in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim Siman 339 Halacha 3).

Even though, many jews dance on Shabbat, including in yeshivot, youth movements and more.
The Rema (Ibid) describes that hardly anyone avoids dancing, and he has two different reactions to this:
We shouldn’t do anything about it, because no one will listen, and it is better they don’t know it is not allowed than do it on purpose.
In light of the fact that the majority of people don’t know how to fix musical instruments, so the Gzeira isn’t necessary anymore.
But, this isn’t enough for us. Because, this will only justify dancing for those who paskin according to the Rema. So, we need to find some other way to to allow this.
Aruch Hashulcah (Siman 339 Seif 9) states that only when dancing to a precise rhythm is it forbidden, but when going around in a circle and sometimes jumping- that isn’t considered dancing. If it is not considered dancing than it isn’t part of the Gzeira and allowed.

Another Kula brought by various Poskim is that dancing on Shabbat is in someway a “Tzorech Mitzva” in order for us to be fully happy and enjoy the Holly day. Rav Ariel once stated that if you treat Shabbat as you Kallah (bride) then you dance for her as if you are the Chatan (groom).

So, dancing is allowed on Shabbat. I do think that it is appropriate to avoid doing other things like look more like playing music, such us claping on the table as if it was a drum etc.

The Gemara (Brachot 26a) states that one who forgot to daven should say the next Tefila twice- once for the actual tefila and one to complete the missing Tefila. this Din is brought down in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim siman 108 seif 1).
Is this Halacha relevant for women too?
According to the Mishna Berura (siman 263 Subsection 43)- yes. Also Caf Hachaim (siman 263 Subsection 65) agrees with that.
The Grashaz (Ishei Yisrael chapter 30 comment 6) paskins that a woman should only complete a tefila that she is used to saying regularly. So, that is why in my short answer I pointed out that the Halacha would depend on that.

If you regularly daven Mincha- then you should daven Maariv twice, first one as maariv and the second as mincha.
If you don’t daven mincha, then there is no need to complete anything. Even so, it is worthwhile davening maariv that day in order not to miss out on the usual number of Tefilot you daven.

Hi,
There is no problem giving non-kosher food to a Goi.
Actually, the Pasuk that teaches us that we are not allowed to eat a carcass states the following (Devarim 14, 21)-

לֹ֣א תֹאכְל֣וּ כָל־נְ֠בֵלָה לַגֵּ֨ר אֲשֶׁר־בִּשְׁעָרֶ֜יךָ תִּתְּנֶ֣נָּה וַאֲכָלָ֗הּ א֤וֹ מָכֹר֙ לְנָכְרִ֔י כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה לַיהוָ֖ה אֱלֹהֶ֑יךָ לֹֽא־תְבַשֵּׁ֥ל גְּדִ֖י בַּחֲלֵ֥ב אִמּֽוֹ׃ (פ)
You shall not eat anything that has died a natural death; give it to the stranger in your community to eat, or you may sell it to a foreigner. For you are a people consecrated to your Hashem. You shall not boil a kid in its mother’s milk.
We can see that the torah, in the same Pasuk that tells us what not to eat, tells us that the gentile is permitted to eat it.

I must add that there is another issue here that needs attention.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’a 151, 11) Paskins according to many Rishonim, that one is prohibited to give gifts to a gentile that we don’t know. One who gives a gift to a Goi that he doesn’t know might even be violating the issur Deoraita of “Lo Techunem”.
The Taz (Subsection 8) explains why we can give a gift to a gentile that we do know- that being that probably the gentile would want to “pay me back” and return the favor, so in fact I’m not really giving a gift.
This Halacha means that you must pay attention to which non-Jew are you giving to non-kosher food.

One more issue- some foods are not allowed to be given to anyone else because they are “Isurei Hana’a” (pleasure prohibitions), like Chametz or Bashar Bechalav. So, just pay attention to this too.

Hi,
Seeming the answer is quite short, even though there is a lot to write about this Sugya- I will make it short.
As you live with your parents, you don’t really need to light Chanukah candles, because you are counted in your parents Hadlaka.
If you really want to light, then you can light at your grandparents if you will be there at least half an hour after lighting.
I would add that in such a case one should make sure that he lights before his parents do, which in your case is not relevant.

In the Gemara (Sukah 51b) it is told about the shul in Alexandria (Egypt) that was so big that not all the crowd could hear the Chazan. What they would do is that the Gabai would holp up a handkerchief each time the crowd needed to answer Amen (or anything else).
In the Mishna (brachot chapter 8) we learn that one is not allowed to say an “amen Yetoma” (Orphan Amen). The issue is, that the Yerushalmi (Brachot chapter 8 Halacha 8) defines this “amen Yetoma” as an amen that one answers without knowing what bracha he is answering, which of course contradicts the Gemara in the Bavli.
There are several approaches in the Rishonim how to solve this problem:
Rashi (Brachot 47a): The Yerushalmi is referring to someone who doesn’t even know that a bracha was made, and only after hearing others say “amen” do they answer too. In Alexandria, on the other hand, all the crowd knew that a bracha was being said, and if they followed in the siddur they knew which one, so then they were allowed to say “Amen” even though they didn’t hear the actual bracha. This explanation was written be Tosfot (brachot 47a) and the Rosh (brachot chapter 7 siman 17).
Rambam (Tefilla chapter 1, halacha 14): If it is a bracha that you are obligated to say (birkat Kriat Shema, for example), then you can’t answer “Amen” unless you have heard the actual bracha, and that it what the Yerushalmi is referring to. But, if it is a bracha that you don’t need to make (your friend is eating a apple) then you can answer “Amen” even if you didn’t hear the Bracha.
Rav Cohen-Tzedek Gaon: no Bracha can be answered “Amen” to unless the bracha was heard, and what was done in Alexandria is not ok.
Rav Nisim Gaon: Any bracha that the whole tzibur needs to hear (Amidah, for example) can’t be answered unless the bracha was heard. What was done in Alexandria was only for the brachot of Kriat HaTorah, when the participants have no obligation to be Yotzei the brachot.
The Beit Yosef (Orach Chaim siman 124, seif 8) paskins like the Rambam, so any bracha that one is obligated to hear can’t be answered “Amen” to unless the bracha was heard, and that is how he rules in the Shulchan Aruch.
The Rema (ibid) is even more machmir, and paskins that any bracha that you didn’t hear you can’t answer “Amen” to, even if you don’t need to be Yotzei. Most of the Ashkenazi Poskim agree with the rema.
The Ben Is Chai (VaYechi, 19) writes in length how sevear “Amen Yetomah” is, and concludes to Paskin like the Rema, and it is interesting that in this case Rav Ovadia agrees with him (Halichot Olam, Terumah, halacha 10).

What should one do when he knows a bracha has been made but he can’t answer “Amen”? Rav Wazner (Shevet Halevi vol. 8 siman 22) says one should say “El Melech Ne’eman” (that is the acronyms of “Amen”), and to intend that it is instead of answering “Amen”.

About Kadish, Rav Wazner (ibid) paskins that even if you don’t know what part of Kaddish has been said, but you know for sure that it is Kaddis, then you can say “Amen” even if didn’t hear the Chazan, because Kaddish is referred to as one long bracha.

The first thing we need to do is to find out the relationship of the Torah to Christianity. This way we can know which halachic rules we should apply to Christians and to their special dates. If Christianity is Idolatry, *then we are forbidden from taking any part in any kind of mentioning or celebration of their special or (so called) holy days*.
The *Rambam* wrote (Interpretation of the Mishna, Avoda Zara, Chapter 1 Mishna 3) that *Christianity is Paganism and Idolatry*, since the Christian religion believes that Hashem was revealed in the form of a physical body, and they also believe that Hashem is revealed in the form of a Trinity, *in contrast to Judaism which believes in particular, that is, that Hashem is one single and united*.
The *Rambam* reiterated this approach in the halachot (Avoda Zerah, Chapter 9, Halachah 4), and many Poskim throughout history agreed with this decision.
On the other hand, *Rabbeinu Tam*, one of the most significant Tosfot Rabies, writes explicitly that *Christianity is not idolatry*. why? According to him, although Christians believe in the Holy Trinity, this is not a heresy in the Deity, but a belief in the Deity only in a different style than Judaism – a style of sharing. As it is in their eyes, there are several factors that together combine to be Hashem.
Of course, we as Jews are *absolutely forbidden to believe in such things*, but such belief among the Gentiles is not as serious as actual idolatry. Idol worship is really a worship that attributes divinity to tangible objects.
Among the Poskim, many agreed with this opinion. According to this, Christianity is not idolatry, and in any case *there is no halachic prohibition to mention or take part in their events*.
Admittedly, after the halachic analysis of the question, *another dimension should be added*.
*We live, Baruch Hashem, in a generation of Geula*. The State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people, to which we have prayed thousands of years. In order for the State of Israel to fulfill its destiny to be the foundation of Hashem’s throne in the world, *she and we are tasked with being proud Jews in all our actions and deeds.*
In our behavior. in our laws. in our speech. In keeping our Torah and mitzvot.
One of the most important things in managing a country *is a calendar*, dates. We, Am Israel, have our own calendar. Our holidays are based on it. All our significant halachic events are based on the Jewish calendar.
*We should be proud of that. We should be happy to use it.*
At the moment we do not live in Eretz Israel, and here there is a real need to use a date that is not ours, but *certainly part of our yearning to get to Geula Shlema is to cherish our own calendar*, and it only.

In the Gemara (Chulin 105b) Rav Nachman *said two things*:
Those who eat two dishes (תבשיל ותבשיל) do not have to wash their hands between dishes.
Whoever eats a stew and cheese (תבשיל וגבינה) *must wash his hands* between them.
The Rishonim differed in the interpretation of this.
*Rashi* (105a) explained that Rav Nachman said a halacha that is *not related to kashrut but to hygiene*. That is, between eating two dishes it is appropriate to wash the hands, but there is no obligation to. According to *Rashbam* it is about two meat dishes or two dairy dishes. On the other hand, *when eating a meaty dish before cheese it is mandatory to wash your hands*. What should one do when eating meat and then wants to eat cheese? Rav Nachman did not refer to the case of eating meat and then cheese.
*Tosfot* (Tosfot 105b s.v. “no”) wonder why you should wash your hands between eating two dishes of the same nature? Even if Rav Nachman says that it is a permission and not an obligation, why is there such a need at all?
Therefore, *Tosfot* explain that these are two different dishes, one meaty and one dairy, *but there is no actual meat or actual cheese*. For example, if you were to eat a potato cooked in a meaty vessel, and immediately after that a pasta cooked in a milky one. In such a case, there is no obligation to wash your hands, but it is only a permission.
Admittedly, when I eat a stew of meat, like the potato that was cooked with actual meat, and then want to eat real cheese, *in such a case it is obligatory to wash my hands, and it does not depend on my will*.
*Shulachan Aruch* ruled (Yoreh Dea Siman 89 Halacha 3) that if one eats a pareve food from a meat stew, it is permissible to eat a pareve food from a cheese stew after it, and *there is no obligation to wash hands between them. But if you want to eat actual cheese after that, you must wash your hands*. He ruled like *Tosfot*.
The *Rama* (ibid) wrote that although the Halacha is as such, but *Am Israel used to treat a Parave food from a meat stew as if it were real meat*, therefore one should not eat cheese after it as if he had eaten real meat, that is- for six hours.
Although, if the potato was cooked in a meat dish *but there was no meat in the dish at the time*, in such a case it is permissible to eat cheese *immediately* after eating the Parave food from the meat dish, that is, the potato. It is important to note – *it is allowed to eat the cheese after eating the potato, but not to eat them together*.
The *Shach* (subsection 19) Wrote that it is permissible to eat cheese immediately after the meaty potato, which the Rama’a said is only valid if there was no meat in the meat dish along with the potato, it is also valid *even if the meat dish was dirty with leftover bits of meat*.
Let’s give an example to explain this – at the McDonald’s branch they fry chicken wings in deep oil. Immediately after removing the wings, they put potato chips in the exact same oil. According to the Shach, even if there are leftover chicken bits in the oil, the chips will be Parave, and immediately after them it is permissible to eat dairy foods, even real cheese.

The *Shach*’s proof of this is very interesting-
Later in Hilchot Kashrut (Siman 95 Halachah 1) it is Paskind about a fish that was in a vessel with meat, but not at the same time, that *is allowed to eat the fish with actual cheese* (the halacha known as Natt bar Natt). Now, let’s compare this case to ours; a potato that was in a meat dish but without the meat would be allowed to eat with actual cheese, so what did the Rama gain by saying that it is allowed to eat the cheese immediately after the potato?
In light of this question, the *Shach* explained the *Rama*’s words as we have said. Admittedly, some *Poskim* did not accept the *Shach*’s explanation, and in their opinion, if the meaty dish was dirty with leftover meat, the potato should be treated as real meat.
*Rav Yitzhak Yosef*, the Sephardi chief rabbi of Israel, *rules to be strict like other Poskim*. Therefore, according to his Psak, a potato that has been cooked in a meat dish that is dirty with leftover meat, it is forbidden to eat dairy food after it, as after eating meat. *Only if the meat vessel was clean while the potato was inside, then it is permissible to eat cheese immediately after the potato*.
Mori VeRabbi, *Rav Avigdor Shilo Shlita*, rules like the *Shach*, and so do I. According to this, even if the meat dish was dirty with leftover meat while the potato was being cooked there, *it is permissible to eat cheese immediately* after eating the potato.
*It is important to clarify – leftover meat means the leftovers, the sauce stuck to the sides of the dish, but of course if there are pieces of meat inside you should not eat cheese after the potato.*
If the meaty vessel was clean- all agree that cheese could be eaten right after eating the potato.

It has been ruled that four people should bench Ha’gomel being in dangerous situations, and one of them is the “desert walkers”.
Nowadays, the question has been asked whether after flying on a plane one should bench Ha’gomel or not.
There are Poskim who believed that one should not bench Ha’gomel after a flight, because *today’s flights are less dangerous even than traveling by car*. This is what *Rav Avraham Stern* wrote (Betzel HaChochma Vol. 1, Seaman 20). Another argument was made in the name of the *Rogochover*, that flying is not considered walking in the desert, since the plane *goes over the desert and not in it*. This is the opinion of the former chief rabbi, *Rav Goren zt’l* (Esa lech rab vol. 6, Siman 16).
On the other hand, many Poskim ruled that the bracha should be said even after flights. *Rav Feinstein* (Igrot Moshe Orach Chaim vol. 2 Siman 59) explained that Ha’gomel should be said when a person goes out of his natural place to a dangerous situation, and *it does not matter the percentage of danger, but the fact that he is in a more dangerous place than his natural place is sufficient*. Therefore, even though the danger in flights is as low as can be, since in the end *there is a certain danger* in this, therefore one should bench Ha’gomel.
*Rav Feinstein* added another reason, which can inspire us to marvel the wisdom that Hashem has given to humans. He claims that flying is naturally much more dangerous than sailing a ship or driving a car, because the fact *that a person can float inside a metal tube 6 km above ground* is something that is “unnatural”.
*Rav Feinstein*’s ruling was agreed by *Tzitz Eliezer* (volume 11, siman 13) as well as *Rav Ovadia* (Yechaveh Daat, volume 2, siman 20).
Although the custom today is to bench Ha’gomel after a flight, the *Poskim mentioned above wrote that it is only on a flight that lasts more than 72 minutes*. That is how it should be done.

The Shulchan Aruch wrote (Orach Haim, Siman 95 Halachah 5) that one should not pray barefoot in a place and time that one is not used to walking like that during the day. The Mishna Berura explained (subsection 13) that this is because standing in Tefilah should be done the same way as one would appear before an important person, since in Tefilah we stand before the king.

And for the sake of the beautiful description, I will add here the Rambam’s words (Tefillah Laws, Chapter 5, Halacha 5)-

Proper clothing: What is implied?
One should adjust his clothing and make himself neat and presentable before [praying], as [implied by Psalms 29:2]: “They bow to Hashem in resplendent holiness.”
One should not pray wearing [only] his undershirt, bareheaded, or barefoot – if it is the custom of the people of that place to stand before their most respected people with shoes.

There are Achronim who wrote that even in Birckat HaMazon and Al Ha’Michya one should not be barefoot.
Therefore, we should be careful when davening to be dressed as we would dress for a meeting with an important person. Since the majority of people these days would not come barefoot to such a meeting, therefore we should avoid coming to Tefilah barefoot.

The Nusach we say does not appear in Chazal exactly, but it does with a minor change.
In the Gemara (Shabbat, page 12b) Rabbi Yossi said that a person praying for a sick person should say “May Ha’Makom have mercy on you among the sick of Israel”. The explanation for this statement was provided by Rabbi Chanina, as he said (ibid.) that those who pray for a sick person should “intercede them among the sick of Israel.”
The interpretation of the words of the Gemara is exactly the wording that we say nowadays, but the first to say our wording precisely was Rabbi Yonatan Melonil, in his commentary to the Gemara.

As we said, our version corresponds to the version in the Gemara in terms of meaning. According to this, we will mention all the names of the sick for whom we are praying, and then we will mention that we are praying for them as part of all the sick of Am Israel, and that we also pray for the rest of the sick of Am Israel to be healed.

The reason for this can be explained on several levels.

At the simplest level, when we pray not only for one person but for all of Am Israel, our Tefillah becomes a general Tefillah, and a general Tefillah is on a higher level than a Tefillah for personal needs.

But there is an even deeper understanding.
The order of the Brachot in the Amidah has meaning, as the Gemara (Megillah 17b) teaches us. The Brachot in the Tefillah create a movement in our soul, which indicates a divine process that also takes place in the world. It was not for nothing that Chazal determined the blessing of healing immediately after the blessing of Geula. Health, and moreover the healing of all the sick of the people of Israel is really part of the revelation of Geula. The appearance of Hashem in reality is manifested not only spiritually, but also physically, in the bodies of each and every one of us.
Therefore, when we pray not only for the individual that we know, but for all the sick in Am Israel, we are actually praying for pushing on the Geula, for the return of all Am Israel to their proper state, in order to hasten the coming of Mashiach Tzidkeinu.

Your question is a very important and fascination Question. The question of the relationship between the value of life and the quality of life is a question that every person asks themselves as they get older, and it is important to know that the Torah has what to say about this moral Question.
You asked this question about the case of an atomic bomb, but we have certain difficulty in answering this question, because we lack a large amount of critical data – i.e. how much suffering are we talking about? Will the person surely die? Are we talking about a young or old person? And there are many more questions.
But, in this answer we will try to touch on the issue of quality of life itself, that is, is it meaningful to live in the world, even when it involves a life of suffering and severe torment. In other words, our question is what is better – to live a life of suffering or to die?
We will review the sources in Chazal that discuss this Question.

Sugia A
There is a halacha (Mishnah, Tractate Sotah, Chapter 3; Rambam, Hilchot Sotah, Chapter 3, Halacha 20) regarding a perverted woman (Isha Sotah), that if one really committed fornication while she was married, and drank the water of Nida in Beit Hamikdash, her punishment is death. On the spot, immediate death.
But, if she has special rights, she earns a different result – instead of dying immediately, she will slowly degenerate over a period of two or three years, and only then does she die. And during those years that she degenerates, she suffers from the same medical symptoms that the Torah describes for an Isha Sotah – necrosis in the legs and prolapse of the pelvis.
There is no need to mention the well-known fact – that these necropsies are unbearably painful. The wounds are caused by the lack of movement in the body, which eventually leads to necrosis, are extremely tormenting.
And despite this – Chazal explain that it is better for that woman to remain in this world for several years even with the most severe suffering, than to die an immediate death.
This halacha is excellent proof to Rabbi Waldenburg’s method in Tzitz Eliezer (Vol 5, Ramat Rachel, Siman 90). In his opinion, a life full of suffering in this world is worth more than death and reaching the next world. Therefore, the reward that woman receives is that she is being tormented in this world for several years, instead of dying immediately. And this is a gift for her!
And in another place he writes (Part 10, Mark 20, Chapter 6) the following words –
“According to the Torah, even a life of sorrow and the agony of illness, from which there is no escape, does not grant and does not allow any person any right to shorten this person’s life for that reason … and anyone who brings death closer to a person who is still breathing, even if he wraps himself in a veil of compassion … he is compared to an ordinary murderer, and it will count that he has blood on his hands. No creature in this world owns the soul of a person … including the person himself. The soul is the property of the Hashem Almighty. He is the giver, even if exclusive ownership has been taken from him.”
The logic of Tzitz Eliezer is very understandable, even if it is difficult to understand in a modern environment. In addition, he has a very strong proof of his method. It must be remembered that the Tzitz Eliezer did not live centuries ago, but only a few decades back, and was at the forefront of the progress of modern medicine. For many years he was the rabbi of Shaare Zedek Hospital in Jerusalem.
I started our Limmud with his opinion, because he represents an extreme method regarding our Question. From now on, we will expand and study more sources, and see how other Poskim explain them, and how Tzitz Eliezer will deal with them.
Sugia B
It is said in the Gemara (Ketuvot 104a) that at the end of Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi’s life he was very ill, and in the Beit Midrash they prayed for his healing. Rabbi’s maid, who was with him at home, also prayed for him to be healed. One day the maid saw Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi suffering most severely, and she could not cope with it, until she changed her Tefillah, and asked that he would die, so that he should not continue to suffer.
When she saw that her Tefillahs were not being accepted, because in the Beit Midrash they were still praying for Rabbi’s healing, she threw a vessel into the Beit Midrash, and when it shattered, everyone stopped their Tefillahs for a brief moment, and at that moment the Rabbi passed away.
We see from this that Rabbi’s maid understood that there are certain levels of suffering that do not justify staying alive, and in this case, it is even permissible to pray for someone to die.
The Ran (Tractate Nedarim 3a) learned from this act that there are situations in which one should pray for the patient to die. That is, the Ran understood that the rabbi’s maid was doing a charitable act. We will add and say that according to his words – if the Talmidim were aware of Rabbi’s suffering, they too would have prayed that he would die, and the reason they did not do so is only because they were not aware of the extent of his sorrow and suffering.
Rav Moshe (Igrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat, Vol II, Siman 73) took a similar direction to the Ran, and reinforced this by claiming that the Rabbi’s maid was known as a scholar, who some would learn Torah from her.
On the other hand, Rav Kook (Tov Roi, Ketubot 159) explained that Rabbi’s maid was wrong, and actually the talmidim were right. Rav Kook went on to explain that Rabbi’s maid was not on the same spiritual level as the talmidim, so she could not understand something very important. A person has two levels of effect on the world – an external effect, i.e. his actions in the world and the like, and an internal effect, which by virtue of being present in the world, he affects it. Even without doing anything, one’s very presence on earth affects the world. Of course, if a person is tzadik, his inner influence on the world is also a good influence.
According to this, Rav Kook explains the maid’s mistake. She thought that people only have an external influence on the world, and in any case, as soon as Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi is not able to influence the world in this way, it is a pity that he should stay here and suffer. But, the students in the Beit Midrash, they knew that there was an inner influence, that the world in which Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi was in, was a completely different world than without him.
It seems that Rav Kook would object to the Ran’s claims that there are situations in which it is permissible to pray for the patient to die. Indeed, it can be claimed that Rav Kook’s words are true specifically for a righteous person, an important person, in which case the inner effects are truly phenomenal, but regarding ordinary people, Rav Kook would agree with the Ran. It seems that this is the better way to understand Rav Kook’s opinion.
The one who will certainly oppose the Ran is the Tzitz Eliezer, whom we studied earlier. Indeed, he writes (Part 9, Mark 7) that the Ran’s words were not accepted as Halacha, since they were not mentioned in the Rambam, in the Tur, in the Shulchan Aruch, or in any of the commentaries on those. Even in the rest of the Rishonim we did not find anyone who wrote like that written by the Ran.
The Tzitz Eliezer (ibid.) also adds that it is precisely the behavior of the talmidim that is correct, and from there, once again, this is proof of his method.
But, unlike what Tzitz Eliezer claimed, the truth is that many Poskim did quote the Ran, which means that he was indeed accepted, at least by some. For example, the Aruch HaShulchan (Yorah De’ah, siman 335, section 3) he wrote that if a patient has many sufferings and he has no chance of recovery, one should pray for him to die. Rav Chaim David Halevi wrote similar things (Mayim Chaim, Vol 3, Siman 36), even though he stated a condition to this claim, that the family members of the patient are not allowed to do this, but only strangers are to pray for death.
Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef (Yalkut Yosef, Visiting the Sick, Chapter 1, Halachah 35) also wrote that there are situations in which one should pray for the patient to die, but that one should not do so without consulting a rabbi. I highly recommend reading the story that Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef tells about his father, Rav Ovadia, in this context, but due to its length I will not tell it here.
Rav Sternbuch (Teshuvot Ve’hanhagot, vol. 2, Siman 738) was very careful about what is permitted and what is prohibited. According to his method, there is no situation in which it is permissible to pray that a sick person will die, but we must subject our will to the will of Hashem. So, what is one permitted to do? It is permissible to pray that the patient will not suffer any longer, and that Hashem will do what is best in his eyes.
In fact, all the Poskim we have mentioned do not agree with the Tzitz Eliezer. According to the Tzitz Eliezer, a life full of suffering is better than death. On the other hand, according to the other Poskim, it is clear that it is better to die than to live a life of suffering, and there any many more Poskim that agree with this opinion, but not all can be mentioned here.
We saw two reservations to this – the first, by Rav Kook, that righteous and important people should remain in the world despite the suffering, because they have influence on the world. And the second, which appears in all the Poskim, is that this whole discussion only begins with a patient whose chance of recovery is zero. A patient who has a chance to be cured of his illness, even though this involves a lot of suffering, there is no way of avoiding treating him. Only when it comes to a patient who will never come out of the state of agony and pain but will remain like this the rest of their lives, only then does the discussion even begin.

Sugia C
We are told in the Gemara (Avoda Zara 18a) about Rabbi Haninah ben Teradion, one of the Ten Royal Slain (Asara Harugei Malchut), who was executed in a fire. The Romans were so cruel, that when they burned him they put cotton pads soaked in water on his heart, to delay the burning of the heart area and thus to delay his death and increase his suffering.
His talmidim asked him – why doesn’t he open his mouth so that the fire can enter faster, and thus he will suffer less. He answered that he is not allowed to do anything that would bring his death closer, but only Hashem can take his soul, for he who gave the soul deserves to take it back.
The Roman official who stood there and saw Rabbi Hanina’s agony, offered to remove the wet sponges. When Rabbi Haninah agreed to his request in order to receive a reward in the next world, the official took away the sponges, Rabbi Haninah died immediately, and that Roman clerk jumped into the fire and died himself.
In this issue there are two matters that are important for us to discuss. The first is the relation of this issue to our general discussion. The second point is the question of whether the patient himself is allowed to take action in order to shorten his own life. In the story we see that Rabbi Haninah refrained from taking any action himself, but an action done by another party is not considered so serious, according to his method.
Regarding the first question, apparently, it seems quite clear that this issue fits better with the opinions of those who decide that it is better to die than to live a life of terrible suffering. The Tzitz Eliezer will have to explain how this issue works out according to his method, and he will probably do it in the following way.
The Chatam Sofer (Responsa Chatam Sofer, Vol. 2, Siman 326) wrote that it was really forbidden for Rabbi Haninah ben Teradion to open his mouth so that the fire could enter, since a person is forbidden to do any action that would shorten his life. This really fits with the method of Tzitz Eliezer. But what will the Chatam Sofer and Tzitz Eliezer do with the end of the story, where Rabbi Haninah allowed a Gentile to remove the water sponges?
There are several possible answers to this:
Rav Feinstein (ibid.) wrote that really this act is also halachically forbidden, except that it was a temporary order, so that the Roman official would repent. Another answer written by Rav Feinstein (ibid) is that it was only the Gentile who was allowed to remove the sponges, because the nations of the world were not commanded to save the lives of the dying. It should be noted that Rav Feinstein later rejected this explanation.
Rabbi Shlomo Luria, one of Ashkenaz’s most important Poskim, wrote (Yam shel Shlomo, Baba Kama, chapter 8 Siman 59) that opening the mouth is indeed forbidden because he does it himself, but letting someone else shorten life is permissible in a suffering and tormented patient. It is important to note that this answer of Rabbi Shlomo Luria is quoted by the Tzitz Eliezer dozens of times in his writings, and it seems reasonable that this is how he would explain the story.
Another explanation we found for the contrast between the beginning of the story and the end was written by Rabbi Firer (Tehumin), where he wrote that there is a difference between taking an active action that shortens life, and removing something that prevents it from ending. Opening of mouth by Rabbi Haninah was an active act to end his life, but removing the sponges does not cause his death, but only removes that which is delaying his it.
Regarding the second question, the opinion of all the Poskim we have mentioned (excluding Rabbi Firer) is that opening the mouth is really forbidden halachically. Admittedly, Ba’al Iyun Ya’akov (Tractate Avoda Zerah, page 18) wrote that halachically it was permissible for Rabbi Haninah to even open his mouth to die immediately, but he had a degree of Hasidut and therefore was stricter on himself and did not do so.
What did we learn from the story of Rabbi Haninah ben Teradion?
Simply put, this is a story that strengthens the hands of those who believe that it is better to die than to live a life of suffering, but that a person must not do this by himself but only by others, or that one must not take active actions in order to die but only to remove the obstacle to his death. In addition, we explained that, although it is a bit hard pressed, even the Tzitz Eliezer can cope with this story.
Sugia D
We are told in the Midrash (Yalkut Shimoni, Parashat Ekab, 871) about an old woman who came before Rabbi Yossi ben Halfata to complain about the suffering in her life. She describes to him how old she is already, her life is not worth anything because she only suffers, i.e., has lost the ability to enjoy food or drink, so she wants to die.
Rabbi Yossi ben Halafta asks her if there is any mitzvah that she is especially careful to do every day, and she answers that she gets up every morning to go to shul.
R. Yossi understands that thanks to this mitzvah the woman continues to live, and orders her to stop going to synagogue for three days. On the third day that old woman died.
Allegedly, this story is extremely overthrows against the Tzitz Eliezer’s method. Why? Because here, not only did one of the Tanaim give advice to a woman on how to shorten her life, but he did also it because she had lost her sense of taste!?!? Is this suffering significant enough for Rabbi Yossi ben Halafta to give people advice on how to die?
In any case, the list of Poskim who believe that death is better than a life full of suffering will be happy to quote this Midrash.
However, Tzitz Eliezer did not refrain from replying. According to him (ibid., part 18, point 8) this case is different, because nothing realistic was done here, on a medical level, but only a purely mystical act. In other words, R. Yossi did not tell the woman to commit suicide, but rather told her to do an act of a religious nature, and that is what caused her to die. According to the Tzitz Eliezer, it is certainly not possible to learn from this that it is permissible to take active actions to shorten a life full of suffering, and it is not possible to learn from here that it is permissible to shorten one’s life in a passive way, because doing a mystical act does not teach us anything for the medical world.
In this context, we will mention that written by Rav Zilberstein (Tzohar, part 3, 1998) who explained as follows – Rabbi Yossi ben Halafta understood that this woman was already supposed to die, according to the ways of nature. So why was she remaining alive? It must be a particularly good deed she is doing, which is causing her to stay alive beyond her time. All Rabbi Yossi did was to advise the woman to avoid the act that keeps her alive. In other words, Rabbi Yossi advised that woman not to perform life-prolonging virtues.
The truth is that there are several other issues that can be discussed, but we have laid the main foundations here.

So, in a nutshell, what have we learned?
We have learned that there are two approaches among the Poskim – the approach of Tzitz Eliezer (and perhaps the Chatam Sofer, and maybe Rav Kook too, but prob not) that it is better to live a life full of suffering than to die, and on the other hand the approach of the majority of Poskim that it is better to die than to live a life full of suffering.
Even those who think it is better to die, certainly do not allow a person to commit suicide. And of course the discussion only refers to a person who has no chance to recover from his suffering (according to the medicine we know). And even in the form of passive action, it is not at all clear how much is allowed and what is allowed to be done in order to shorten life.
What is clear is that according to those who believe that death is better than a life full of suffering, there is no mitzvah (and no need) to take active action that prolong this life.
It is important for me to emphasize – this is a question in which I do not, under any circumstances, intend to posek a practical ruling. Each question regarding these halachot needs to be personally asked to a Talmid Chacham, as each case is defferent.
So, this isn’t a practical Teshuva, for two reasons.
First, because Be’ezrat Hashem this question will never be practical.
And secondly, because this is a very complex question, with many aspects that need to be discussed, and I have not answered all of them. On the halachic level, this discussion takes place mainly regarding old people who are sick with serious diseases. There, some of the Poskim also give weight to the person’s personal will, something we did not address here. There is an extremely important discussion on the question of how long it will take to die with the suffering, because there are halachic definitions of “momentary life”, “eternal life”, and the halachic references differ from one situation to another.
Of course, I could not raise all the discussions here.
We will now try to raise some points for the question about an atomic bomb.
Certainly, according to the Tzitz Eliezer’s method, a person must do what he can to keep himself alive as long as possible, no matter how much suffering it will cause him. Therefore, it is clear that one must run for cover in order to be saved from the initial blast, and only die later from the radiation.
According to the rest of the Poskim there is a lot of room for discussion – if a person is in a place where the explosion will probably kill him immediately, it is not clear that he must run for cover, and indeed, it can be said that he is allowed to stay in his place and let the explosion take do it’s thing. Although, if he is already in a sheltered area, apparently he is not allowed to leave there to an exposed place for the explosion to harm him, which is in terms of taking an active action to shorten life.

The Peyot need to get to the end of the cheekbone, but according to most Poskim they don’t need to go beyond it.

The truth is, this is the million-dollar question in Judaism, to which there is no good answer, and it is why bad things happen to Tzadikim people, to Tzadikim, also known as “Tzadik VeRa Lo”.
It would be more correct to say that at this moment in time we do not have an answer, but in the future we will know, and I will explain.

The moral question of “Tzadik VeRa Lo” has already disturbed Moshe Rabbeinu. This is Chazal teach us (Gamara, Brachot 7a), that when Moshe spoke to Hashem and asked to know his ways of leading the world, Moshe actually asked for an explanation as to why there are Tzadikim people who bad things happen for them and why there are Reshaim people who have a good outcome.

What was the answer that Moshe received? There is no Answer That humans are unable to understand Hashem’s accounts. “לא יראני האדם וחי”, “a human being may not see Me and live”.

And this is true for so many things in life.
In the question you mentioned that even though Hashem provides for the whole world there are still hungry people.
I can add more examples-
Although Hashem is a healer, many people are sick.
Even though Hashem “is good to all” there are people who have lives full of suffering.
Although Hashem is “merciful for all his creations” there are people who have bad things happen to them.

Nevertheless, our belief in Hashem being good and moral is not impaired. We believe that each and every person on earth gets exactly what they need and exactly what they deserve. And we also believe that in the future we will understand more.

Chazal teach us this too. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish tells us (Avoda Zara 3b)-

“There is no Gehennam in the World-to-Come. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will remove the sun from its covering [Nartik], where it is situated during these times… the Tzadikim will be healed by it. The Reshaim will be punished by it.”

What does this mean?

The meaning is that in the future Hashem will take the sun out of its sheath. The sun, as we know, makes light. If the sun is inside a wrapping, it means that its light is covered, and you cannot see or benefit the light.

This is reality before “the future comes” [Le’atid Lavo]. There is darkness for now. There is moral darkness. We are unable to understand Hashem’s actions, and how everything he does is justified.

But, after the sun comes out of the covering, the Tzadikim will be healed by it and the Reshaim vice versa. why? Because, when in the future Hashem Almighty will reveal his accounts to us, it will be revealed to the eyes of all that Hashem’s leadership of the world is and was always moral, just, and good for all.
Then, the Tzadikim will be happy, because it will be proven that their faith in the Adon Olam was correct. And the Reshaim, at that time they will stand to trial, because it will be proven to everyone that their misbelief in the morality of Hashem was a mistake. A fatal one.

Back to us – since we know and believe that in the coming future Hashem will indeed reveal to us the reasons for everything, then we need to and are obligated to believe this already now, even though many times it does not seem so in our eyes.